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Abstract 
 
Several corporate scandals are related to lack of concerning stakeholders’ interest.  The voice of 
enhancing stakeholders’ engagement in corporate governance framework is increasing.  The paper 
is aimed to determine the pragmatic and applicable one-tier and two-tier board models for integrating 
stakeholders as board directors in multinational corporations.  It begins with discussing why 
multinational corporations need to concern on stakeholders’ interest and analysing different 
theoretical approaches for linking board composition with financial performance and corporate social 
performance.   It will then review corporate governance frameworks integrating stakeholders’ 
engagement in various jurisdictions and economic status (i.e. emerging markets and developed 
markets).  Finally, pragmatic multi-stakeholder board models for one-tier and two-tier board 
structures will be proposed through defining board composition, CEO duality and mechanism to 
resolve disputes arise from board members. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Multinational corporations (MNC, also known as multinational enterprises, transnational 
corporations or global corporations) refer to enterprises which operate in all sectors of the economy 
and usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one country (OECD, 2011).  
There are two main characteristics of MNCs: 1) large size of firm; and 2) parent companies centrally 
control their worldwide activities (Zhang, 2003).  Therefore, a MNC board’s decision which may 
cause the success or failure of a MNC will affects the livelihood of tens of thousands of its employees 
and their families.  Moreover, MNCs always contribute to the economies of both home and host 
countries, especially contributing to economies of developing countries through providing job 
opportunities, capital (foreign direct investment) and technology.  In the perspectives of 
international politics, some large MNCs also have their political influence and diplomatic function 
(Nye, 1974; Irogbe, 2013).  Therefore, quality of MNCs’ board decision is crucial, as it affects not 
only the corporations, but also economies and societies of relevant countries. 
 
Unfortunately, as shown in Table 1 below, numerous corporate scandals were happened in recent 
years.  These scandals generally were caused by unethical decision-making and lack of concerning 
stakeholders’ interest.  For example, the defective ignition switches scandal of General Motors (GM) 
have been linked to at least 97 deaths from 2005 to 2014.  However, evidence has shown that top 
management of GM knew the issue of defect since at least 2003 (Plumer, 2015).  The scandal 
damages not only customers’ interest, but also shareholders’ interest, especially minority 
shareholders.  
 
Table 1: MNCs’ corporate scandals in recent years 
Years Company Corporate Scandal 
2001 Enron Misrepresenting of financial statements 
2002 WorldCom Accounting fraud 
2003 Parmalat Accounting fraud 
2006 Siemens Bribing business partners and employee representatives 
2007 Toyota Unintended acceleration predicament caused deaths 
2008 Lehman Brothers Accounting fraud 
2010 Foxconn Suicide of workers due to poor working condition 
BP Oil spill 
2014 General Motors Defective ignition switches caused deaths 
2015 Volkswagens Circumventing emission test 
Nestle Using slave labours in Thailand 
2016 Apple Tax avoidance 
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Moreover, the Volkswagens and Siemens cases showed that weak oversight of board and lack of 
outsiders in the board to provide independent advice (Milne, 2007; Bryant and Milne, 2015; Van der 
Heyden, 2015).  In addition, some of the scandals are related to environmental injustice and human 
rights abuses, including forced eviction, pollution, violence, sexual abuses and child labour.  
Foxconn’s workers suicide scandals, BP’s oil spill and Nestle’s slave labours scandal are typical 
examples.  
 
Shareholder supremacy norm and corporate scandals 
It is not exaggerated to say that shareholder supremacy norm is a dominant philosophy in corporate 
governance.  The doctrine of shareholder supremacy norm is that management of a company should 
strive to maximize value for its shareholders (Macey, 2008).  The dominance of shareholder 
supremacy norm in corporate governance is mainly achieved by two classical theories of corporate 
finance: agency theory and stewardship theory.  Agency theory defines an agency relationship as a 
contract under which the principal (shareholders) engage the agent (directors or manager) through to 
perform service on their behalf.  The divergence of the interests between principal and agent can be 
aligned by offering appropriate incentives to agent and incurring monitoring costs designed to limit 
the aberrant activities of the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Stewardship theory suggests 
stewards (directors) have a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the principals (shareholders) and 
to make decisions on their behalf (Letting et al., 2012).  As stewards have the legal duty to act for 
their principal, they must put their principals’ interest on the first priority when there is any conflict 
of interests between principals and other stakeholders (Tricker, 2009).  Backed by the two theories, 
shareholder supremacy norm protects and maximizes the interest of shareholders (i.e. profit 
maximization of shareholders).  However, the stewards and agents may lead to short-termism and 
externalization of costs in order to enhance their performance (Smith 2003; Stout, 2012), and possibly 
causes the illegal and unethical corporate scandals. 
 
Stakeholder theory and independent directors 
Stakeholder theory brings alternative perspective in corporate governance.  Stakeholders are defined 
as any group of individual who is affected by or can affect the achievement of an organization’s 
objectives (Freeman 1984).  They are commonly classified into two categories: internal stakeholders 
(including shareholders, boards of directors, managers and employees) and external stakeholders 
(including suppliers, customers, creditors, government agencies, communities and environment) 
(Mitroff, 1983; Cavanagh and McGovern, 1988; Ferrell et al., 2009). Stakeholder theory suggests that 
directors should address the interest of all stakeholders in a firm (Jensen, 2002).  Different from 
agency and stewardship theories, stakeholder theory creates value to all stakeholders (Argandona, 
2011), enhances the legitimacy of corporate decision (Jensen, 2002) and presents corporate morality 
(Jones, 1995).   
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The stakeholder perspective is strongly linked to corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Jamali, 2008) 
and thus it may prevent corporate scandal and unethical corporate decision.  In certain civil-law 
jurisdictions with two-tier corporate board structure, such as Germany and Japan, stakeholder theory 
has been adopted in some extent. The supervisory boards contain employees’ representatives in 
addition to directors chosen by shareholders to appoints the management board, which is responsible 
for the operational management of the corporation, and oversees its actions (Dinh, 1999).  The 
system protects the interest of employees and reduce the conflict between management and workers.  
Moreover, employees’ representatives can also be found in one-tier boards in some civil-law 
jurisdictions, such as Sweden and Norway (Conchon, 2013).  However, the concept of employees’ 
representatives has not addresses externalities produced by the firm, such as effects on the 
environment or consumers (Gelter, 2016). 
 
Moreover, under the Anglo-American shareholder supremacy governance model, directors who are 
appointed by the shareholders and managers who are employed by directors have no right to spend 
company resources for the interest of outsiders (Ambler and Wilson, 1995).  However, in past three 
decades, independent directors play an important role in managing conflict of interest of board 
directors and managers especially under the one-tier board system (Cox, 2003).  Resource 
dependence theorists suggests that independent directors can provide more resource, such as 
independent advice and external connections, and legitimacy to the board, while they are 
knowledgeable about the changing demand of various stakeholders (Ayuso and Argandona, 2007).  
Therefore, in certain extent, independent directors are expected to be custodians of stakeholders’ 
interests (De Masi and Paci, 2014). 
 
However, independent directors are elected/appointed by shareholders/management. When there is a 
conflict between shareholders and other stakeholders, it is expected that independent directors should 
primary protect the interest of shareholders.  Moreover, the independence of independent directors 
is questioned.  Empirical studies indicated that independent directors appointed during a CEO’s 
tenure may similarly beholden to the CEO (Morse, Nanda and Seru, 2011; Coles et al., 2013).  A 
research found that companies with dispersed ownership structures misclassify directors as 
independents more frequently than do companies with large controlling owners (Crespi-Cladera and 
Pascual-Fuster, 2013).  Therefore, independent directors are not an effective way to protect 
stakeholders’ interest and to prevent unethical corporate decision. 
 
Multi-stakeholder board 
In recent decade, the voice of enhancing stakeholders’ engagement in corporate governance 
framework is increasing due to corporate scandals and controversies on corporate activities.  
Countries introduce initiatives in their corporate governance framework to enhance directors’ concern 
on stakeholders’ interests.  Companies, especially MNCs, cannot afford to ignore stakeholders’ 
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interests as all stakeholder groups contribute to companies’ success (Nwanji and Howell, 2005).  
They are increasingly to engage with stakeholders at a much earlier stage of their corporate project 
than in the past (IFC, 2007).  However, Spitzeck and Hansen (2010) argue that the dialogue-based 
and advisory-based stakeholder engagement activities are incapable to observe all stakeholders’ needs, 
and suggest to give stakeholders real power on decision making process. 
 
Moreover, Huse and Rindova (2001) indicated that various stakeholders have different expectations 
of board roles.  Therefore, stakeholders participating in company’s boards of directors could be an 
effective way for balancing conflict of interests among stakeholders and improving its social 
performance (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992), and legitimizing boards’ decisions (Shahzad et al., 2016).  
Indeed, the concept of multi-stakeholder governance which brings stakeholders together to participate 
in dialogue and decision making for common problems or goals is gradually adopted in the 
governance of global non-governmental organizations (Vallejo and Hauselmann, 2004).  Applying 
the concept in corporate governance is encouraged (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000; Ayuso and 
Argandona, 2007; Blount, 2015).  Table 2 illustrates the key difference between the concept of 
shareholder and stakeholder governance model. 
 
Table 2: Key distinctions between shareholder and stakeholder perspectives (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000) 
 Shareholder perspective Stakeholder perspective 
Purpose Maximize shareholder wealth Pursue multiple objectives of parties 
with different interests 
Governance structure Principal-agent model (managers 
are agents of shareholders) 
Team production model 
Governance process Control Coordination, cooperation and 
conflict resolution 
Performance metrics Shareholder value sufficient to 
maintain investor commitment 
Fair distribution of value created to 
maintain commitment of multiple 
stakeholders 
Residual risk holder Shareholders All stakeholders 
 
However, opponents of such stakeholder democracy fears that it takes long time to generate consent 
in a board, and thus may produces inefficient decision and affects the profitability of a company 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000).  Therefore, in the next section, it will discuss the relationship 
between stakeholders’ governance, efficiency on decision making, and corporate performance.  It 
will then study some stakeholder engagement initiatives introduced in various countries’ corporate 
governance frameworks in recent decades.  Finally, it will seek the pragmatic way to establish multi-
stakeholder board under both one-tier and two-tier board regimes.   
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2 Stakeholders Governance, Efficiency and Corporate Performance 
 
Critics of stakeholder governance argued the decision making process of such approach is inefficient 
and thus negatively affects corporate performance.  Indeed, multi-stakeholder boards aim to make 
legitimate decision in which interests of all stakeholders are balanced and the external costs are 
internalized.  A trade-off should be made for making quality decision.  However, it does not mean 
that we can ignore the time cost in order to make the most optimized decision.  Figure 1 in below 
which is introduced by Vallejo and Hauselmann (2004) shows the interdependence between 
legitimacy and efficiency.  The red curve shows the diminishing of the speed as the increase of 
stakeholder participation while the blue curve shows the enhancement of legitimacy through 
increasing participation of stakeholders.  The intersection of the two curves (point O) represents an 
optimal level of efficiency.  The green area surrounding point O is the zone of efficiency.  Outside 
the green area can be described as inefficient. It is expected that a multi-stakeholder board has to try 
to meet the green area when it makes trade-off between legitimacy and efficiency. 
 
 
Figure 1: Speed versus legitimacy (Vallejo and Hauselmann, 2004) 
 
The “green area” of efficiency is an abstract concept.  Nevertheless, three of the six main features 
of multi-stakeholder initiative highlighted by Ruggie (2008) provides a good guidance for making a 
relatively efficient decision through a multi-stakeholder board, including clarity of purpose, 
involvement of relevant stakeholders and transparency.  Firstly, clarity of purpose means that a 
multi-stakeholder board should has a clear scope of mission.  Shareholders and stakeholders must 
come together to decide (or shareholders have a discretion to decide) which matters require multi-
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stakeholder board to decide.  Secondly, a stakeholders mapping is required to define which kind of 
stakeholders are relevant to be included into a board.  Thirdly, optimal level of transparency drives 
an efficient decision-making process.  The features enhance the efficiency of the decision-making 
process.  Details of multi-stakeholder board’s scope of mission and stakeholders mapping will be 
discussed in section 4 of this paper. 
 
2.1 Stakeholders Governance and Corporate Social Performance 
In addition to efficiency, corporate performance is another concern.  Corporate performance can be 
divided into corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP).  CSP 
can be defined as companies’ configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social 
responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s societal 
relationships (Wood, 1991).  It is the extended concept of CSR that place more of an emphasis on 
result achieved (SAGE, 2012). 
 
Stakeholders governance which included the voice of external stakeholders in corporate boards, such 
as environment and retail customers, is possible to make ethical and social responsive decision, and 
thus to enhance companies’ CSP.  Empirical studies on the relationship between stakeholder 
governance and CSP also support this argument (Coffey and Wang, 1998; Brower and Mahajan, 2010; 
Taneja et al., 2017).  Besides, researches found that board diversity positively affects companies’ 
CSR performance (Sanchez et al., 2011; Harjoto et al., 2014) and positively relates to transparency 
in companies’ reporting of social and environmental performance (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013).  
Board diversity is one of the key feature of a multi-stakeholder board. Therefore, the adoption of 
multi-stakeholder board could enhance companies’ CSP. 
 
Corporate social performance and corporate financial performance 
There is a long debate about the relationship between CSP and CFP.  The relationship could be 
neutral, positive and negative.  Supporters of negative relationship argue that engaging in CSR 
activities creates few economic benefits and incurs costs that could be avoided, and thus decreases 
the CFP (Friedman, 1970; Aupperle et al., 1985).  From this viewpoint, the main concern is whether 
multi-stakeholder boards decrease CFP in order to enhance CSP. 
 
Simionescu (2015) initiates CSR activities with stakeholder ability to influence (SAI) could make 
positive relationship with CFP.  SAI is defined as the ability of a company to identify, act on and 
profit from an opportunity to improve stakeholder relationships through CSR.  Simonescu argued 
that CSR activities that do not generate SAI will not create any return from CSR activities and thus 
affects CFP, while CSR activities which target the improve of stakeholder relationship leads later on 
to successful CFP.  Indeed, multi-stakeholder board which empower stakeholders voting rights on 
board is the most effective mechanism to increase SAI.  Moreover, Ayuso and Argandona (2007) 
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argued that a board with diverse stakeholders will promote CSR activities within a firm and will 
ultimately lead to better financial performance of a firm. 
 
2.2 Stakeholders Governance and Corporate Financial Performance 
On the other hand, with the viewpoint of positive or neutral CSR-CSP relationship, the main concern 
is whether multi-stakeholder boards can directly benefit on CFP.  Numbers of empirical studies 
found that board diversity and stakeholders’ involvement in corporate governance are positively 
associated with CFP (Baysinger and Bulter, 1985; Ezzamel and Waston, 1993; Ayuso et al., 2007).  
Good CFP (in terms of return on assets, return on equity and return on sales) and quality of 
management go along with good treatment of stakeholders like employees, customers and 
communities (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Berman et al., 1999).  Moreover, Schwarcz (2016) found 
that the inclusion of bondholders in corporate board could help companies to reduce systemic risk 
and enhance companies’ CFP.  It is because bondholders, same as shareholders, concern on the 
performance of companies they invested and concern on risk perspective than shareholders. 
 
Resource dependence theory provides a good explanation on the relationship between stakeholders’ 
governance and CFP.  As mentioned, the theory underlines the role of directors as resource providers 
(Hillman et al., 2000).  A multi-stakeholder board which composed by stakeholders from various 
constituencies brings valuable resources, including expertise, business/non-business connection and 
innovation, to a company and enhances CFP.  For example, suppliers’ and customers’ 
representatives may bring connection of the upper and lower part of the value chain.  It may help 
the cost control of the company, make any potential synergy through the connection to enhance CFP. 
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3 Stakeholder Engagement in Global Corporate Governance Framework 
 
This paper aim to seek the pragmatic way to establish a multi-stakeholder board under both one-tier 
and two-tier board regimes.  Therefore, it is necessary to understand and review the existing 
corporate governance structures and initiatives implemented for stakeholder engagement and 
stakeholder governance in both developed and developing countries.   
 
3.1 Corporate Governance Framework 
 
There are generally two types of corporate board structures depending on the legal origin of a 
jurisdiction (Deakin, 2013).  Jurisdictions with common-law tradition, such as the US the UK and 
Hong Kong, generally adopt variants of the one-tier board structure.  On the other hand, two-tier 
board structure is generally adopted in civil-law jurisdictions, such as Germany and Japan.  However, 
some civil-law jurisdictions, such as Norway and Sweden, adopt one-tier structure.  Jurisdictions 
like France, Romania and Italy allow companies to choose between the two types of board structures. 
 
Under one-tier structure, board members, include executive directors and non-executive directors, are 
elected by the shareholders in shareholders’ meeting and plays both management and supervisory 
functions.  The board leadership structure in one-tier boards can be variant.  Some boards separate 
the role between chief executive officer (CEO) and board chairman while others combine the two 
roles.  This is referred as CEO duality (Maassen, 2002).  One-tier boards also make often use of 
board committees to carry out specified functions assigned boards, such as audit and remuneration 
committees.  Also, as mentioned, there is a fraction of seat in one-tier boards for independent 
directors.  Besides, in some European countries with one-tier structure, such as Sweden and Norway, 
employee representatives should be included in corporate boards.  Different from the one-tier board 
with stakeholder supremacy structure, all board members in Swedish companies are non-executive. 
 
Two-tier structure, which includes supervisory board and management board, is designed to separate 
the executive function of a board from its monitoring function (Maassen, 2002).  Supervisory board, 
consists of non-executive supervisory directors, oversees and advises management board’s works 
while management board, consists of executive directors, performs management and day-to-day 
operation functions.  The hierarchal relationship between two boards is variant in different countries.  
For example, in Germany and Austria, supervisory board members are elected by shareholders in 
shareholders’ meeting (except employee representatives whose elected by employees and trade 
union). The board owns the power to appoint and dismiss the management board.  In China and 
France, however, member of both supervisory board and management board of a company are elected 
by shareholders in shareholders’ meeting.  Employees’ representatives are included in supervisory 
boards in some countries, such as Germany and Japan, but excluded from the boards in other countries, 
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such as Belgium and Romania (Conchon, 2013).  Moreover, CEO has no seat in the supervisory 
board.  Therefore, board leadership of two-tier structure is independent from the executive function 
of the board (Maassen, 2002). 
 
With no standardized corporate governance framework, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has published “G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance” to 
provide an international benchmark for good corporate governance.  The role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance has been covered in the principles.  It requires that corporate governance 
frameworks should recognize stakeholders’ rights through legislation or mutual agreements, and 
provide stakeholders opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights (OECD, 2015).  
The principles also expect corporate boards to take due regard of, and deal fairly with, stakeholders’ 
interests, and support mechanisms for employee participation.  Although the principles are non-legal 
binding, initiatives in many countries are introduced in accord with the principles (Ajibo, 2014). 
 
3.2 Initiatives for stakeholder participation 
 
Continental European countries which adopt two-tier board structure have mechanism for stakeholder 
participation on board, while countries adopt one-tier board structure trend to apply fiduciary duties 
of directors to stakeholders’ interest, and enhance stakeholders’ participation through appointment of 
independent directors and stakeholder engagement. 
 
Corporate Co-determination and stakeholder representatives 
Co-determination refers to a concept for employee consultation and participation in company 
decisions (Muswaka, 2014).  Even though the UK was probably the first country to legislate for co-
determination on corporate boards (McGaughey, 2014), it currently adopts shareholder supremacy 
approach.   The German two-tier corporate governance structure is typical model of corporate co-
determination.  The German Co-determination Act of 1976 is modern legislation for corporate co-
determination which designates the composition of supervisory boards.  In company with less than 
2,000 employees, employee representatives occupy one-third of the supervisory board.  In company 
with more than 2,000 employees, the employee representatives are nominated by employees, trade 
union/work council, and elected by employees.  Moreover, in companies with more than 1,000 
employees and conducting iron, steel and coal businesses, employee representatives occupy half of 
the supervisory board.  These representatives are nominated by trade union and work council, and 
elected by shareholders meeting.  Therefore, both employees of a company and labour community 
hold the stake in the German company’s supervisory board. 
 
Different from Germany, the corporate governance framework of France requires supervisory boards 
to include not only employees’ representatives (which is nominated by employees and trade union 
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and elected by employee), also minority shareholders' representatives.  The minority shareholders’ 
representatives are appointed as independent directors, in a variable proportion depending on the 
shareholding structure of the company.  Moreover, the French company law requires listed 
companies to have a minimum of 40% female representation on boards by 2017 (IFA and PIFCE, 
2015). 
 
Co-determination is also applied in one-tier board structure.  In Sweden, companies with activities 
in several branches and at least 1000 employees can have three employees’ representatives (and three 
deputies who can attend board meeting with a consultative voice) appointed by trade union.  
However, the maximum number of employee directors may never exceed half of the board (Conchon, 
2013). 
 
The corporate governance framework of India which adopts shareholder supremacy model has no co-
determination concept.  However, under Indian Companies Act 2013, each listed company in India 
is required to appoint at least one female director on its board.  It is rare case that stakeholder 
representative is included in shareholder supremacy board structure. 
 
Directors’ fiduciary duties applied to stakeholders’ interest 
Most of the common-law jurisdictions, which adopt shareholder supremacy model, expand directors’ 
fiduciary duties to cover stakeholders’ interest and enhance disclosures for enabling stakeholders to 
make an informed assessment on companies.  In the UK, enlightened shareholder value is 
introduced through its Companies Act 2006.  Enlightened shareholder value requires directors to 
consider stakeholder’s interests for the purpose of enhancing shareholders’ long term value 
(Naniwadekar and Varottil, 2016).  However, shareholder interest should be first considered when 
there is conflict of interest between shareholders and other stakeholders. 
 
India takes another approach through its Companies Act 2013.  It requires directors to act in the best 
interests of the company and all stakeholders, including shareholders, without creating any hierarchy.  
Moreover, a Stakeholder’s Relationship Committee and a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee 
are established under the board in each Indian listed company mandated by the Companies Act 2013.  
The former which is chaired by an independent director aims to redress the grievances of stakeholders, 
while the latter, which consists of at least 3 directors of whom at least one should be independent, 
aims to formulate CSR policy and to ensure company to spend at least 2% of its net profits on CSR 
activities.  Comparing with the British approach, the Indian approach provide equal treatment to the 
interest of shareholders and other stakeholders.  However, stakeholders have no representative on 
boards. 
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Similar to the value of the Indian approach, the stakeholder-inclusive approach adopted in the 
corporate governance framework of South Africa. It requires directors to considers the legitimate 
interests and expectations of stakeholders as the best interests of the company, and to treat the interest 
of shareholder and other stakeholders equally (IoDSA, 2009).  The King Code of Governance 
Principles (King III) which emphasis more on the interaction between company and its stakeholders 
(Vorster and Marais, 2014) requires boards to develop mechanism for constructive stakeholder 
engagement, to implementing stakeholder strategies and policies, and to report financial, ethics and 
social performance to all stakeholders.  Also, it requires that board chairman should be an 
independent non-executive director.  The King III code has no requirement on stakeholder 
representatives on board, however a set of Codes of Good Practice formulated in accordance with the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 2003, an act led to the enrichment of disadvantaged 
people, require companies to ensure a reasonable percentage of their shares are in the hands of black 
people and to ensure the appointment of black people at board and managerial levels. 
 
The corporate governance frameworks of the two financial centres, the US and Hong Kong, has no 
specific requirement on directors to act for stakeholders’ interests and on appointing stakeholder 
representatives.  Though the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires to increase the fraction of independent 
directors, the directors are viewed as more likely to prioritize the shareholders’ interests (White, 2006).  
Hong Kong adopts “comply or explain” approach to require listed companies to publish 
environmental and social governance report to disclose non-financial performance to the public, 
including stakeholders and to publish corporate governance report which require companies to have 
policy concerning board diversity. 
 
Table 3: Summary of corporate governance frameworks reviewed 
 Board 
Structure 
Interests that Directors 
act for 
Stakeholder 
Representative on Board 
Germany Two-tier Stakeholders Employees 
France Both Stakeholders Employees and female 
Sweden One-tier Stakeholders Employees 
UK One-tier Stakeholders (higher 
priority for shareholders) 
No 
India One-tier Stakeholders Female 
South Africa One-tier Stakeholders Black people 
US One-tier Shareholders No 
Hong Kong One-tier Shareholders No 
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4 Proposed Multi-Stakeholder Board for Multinational Corporations 
 
Some countries’ frameworks allow specific kind of stakeholder representatives, such as employees 
and women, or extend directors’ fiduciary duties to stakeholders’ interests.  The frameworks only 
provide a minimum requirement for companies to comply with.  Companies enhance stakeholder 
engagements on top of the statutory requirement.  In the US, a shareholder supremacy regime, 
minority representation on board is scant under non-mandatory pressures (White, 2006; Russell, 
2013).  Therefore, it is possible to establish multi-stakeholder board under the current frameworks 
in both developed and developing countries. 
 
4.1 Scope of Mission 
 
Clarifying board’s scope of mission enhances the efficiency of decision.  For the company’s internal 
issue, stakeholder representatives may not need to involve.  For seeking the pragmatic way to 
building mechanism for stakeholder governance, co-determination is agreed as a core concept for the 
proposed multi-stakeholder board.  Therefore, it can take reference to supervisory board’s mission 
from the German Corporate Governance Code.  It stated that the supervisory board is involved in 
decisions of fundamental importance to the company, including issues related to fundamentally 
change of company’s asset, financial or earnings situations (Regierungskommission Deutscher 
Corporate Governance Kodex, 2014).  Moreover, building such boards aim to make board’s 
decision to address stakeholder’s interest and to be more social responsive.  Thus, multi-stakeholder 
board should be involved on the corporate decisions those will fundamentally affect company’s 
financial situation and affect stakeholders’ interests. 
 
4.2 Board Composition 
 
Stakeholder mapping is required for picking representatives of essential stakeholder groups, and 
limiting the board size.  Indeed, many companies have defined their key stakeholders.  For 
example, Atlas Copco, a Swedish-based global industrial group, has defined its key stakeholders in 
its Business Code of Practice (Atlas Copco, 2012).  Also, Hong Kong’s CLP Group has described 
their scope of diversity in their board diversity policy, including gender and ethnicity (CLP Group, 
2016).  It can be a foundation for further selection of representatives on board. 
 
For stakeholders mapping, it, suggests to adopt the three group of classification made by Rodriguez 
et al. (2002) to differentiate among stakeholders.  Table 4 shows the definitions and examples of the 
classification. 
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Table 4: Classification of stakeholders (Rodriguez et al., 2002) 
Classification Definition Examples 
Consubstantial 
Stakeholders 
Stakeholders that are essential for 
the company’s existence 
Shareholders, minority shareholders, 
investors and employees 
Contractual 
Stakeholders 
Stakeholders that have formal 
contract with the company 
Creditors, suppliers, sub-contractors 
and customers 
Contextual 
Stakeholders 
Stakeholders that are affected by 
company’s action in the non-
business and social perspective 
Communities, environments, trade 
unions, government agencies and 
opinion makers 
 
Basically, representatives of consubstantial stakeholders should be included in the multi-stakeholder 
board.  Stakeholder analysis matrix developed by Wye College (1998) to selecting representatives 
for non-profit multi-stakeholder initiatives, as Figure 2 shown, can also be adopted for the selection 
of representative on corporate board from contractual and contextual groups. 
 
 
Figure 2: Stakeholder analysis matrix (Wye College, 1998) 
 
The board make a high-level decision in a MNC.  Thus, stakeholder representatives should be 
selected in broader perspective.  It suggests to select environment’s and customers’ representatives 
from international organizations for environmental and customer protection.  Issues of local 
customer or specific environment can be addressed by board committee for stakeholder engagement.  
Moreover, nomination committee should consider the diversity of gender and ethnic minority on 
board composition.  Equal allocation between male and female on board is expected. 
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Board committee 
Committees under board for understanding specific stakeholders’ need in local perspective is 
necessary.  For example, a multinational oil company can establish a stakeholder relationship 
committee or a project-based ad-hoc committee composed by relevant stakeholder representatives for 
evaluating the effect of its project located in an African village to villagers and the ecosystem of the 
village through a dialogue-based stakeholder engagement, and for proposing a redress scheme to the 
board for villagers’ grievances.  Moreover, company can invite delegates of stakeholder groups 
without representation on board due to limit of board size to such committees for better stakeholders’ 
communication and consultation. 
 
4.3 Multi-stakeholder Board in One-tier Structure 
 
Figure 3 shows the proposed multi-stakeholder board for one-tier structure.  It suggests that all 
consubstantial stakeholders, including representatives of employees (but not trade union 
representatives) and minority shareholders, are included in the existing board of directors.  Other 
stakeholders will be involved when the issue is subject to multi-stakeholder board.   
 
 
Figure 3: Proposed multi-stakeholder board for one-tier board structure 
 
Number of stakeholder representatives, including employees’ representatives, and number of board 
directors, excluding chairman, should be equally weighted.  Chairman only can vote when the voting 
deadlock exists (i.e. casting vote).  Therefore, it is expected that chairman should be an independent 
director.  Moreover, alternative dispute resolutions (ADRs), such as mediation and arbitration, can 
used for resolving dispute arise from controversial decision or from incapability of chairman to 
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exercise casting vote (e.g. conflict of interests).  For example, mediation committee or arbitration 
committee can be established for the issue. 
 
CEO duality 
Though some researches show that CEO duality has positive linear relationship with accounting 
performance and financial strength (Lam and Lee, 2001; Tin and Shu, 2008), it reduces concern of 
stakeholders’ interest (Benson et al., 2011).  Also, Webb (2004) found that social responsible firms 
are most likely to separate the role of CEO from chairman.  Hence, for the interest of stakeholders 
and companies’ CSP, it suggests the board’s chairman should not hold the position of CEO. 
 
4.4 Two-tier Board Structure 
 
Multi-stakeholder board can be pragmatically built on the foundation of the well-constructed dual 
board approach.  Figure 4 shows All stakeholder representatives are included in the supervisory 
board of the proposed multi-stakeholder board.  Representatives for stakeholders, including 
employees’ representatives, and for shareholders in supervisory board should be equally weighted.  
As employees’ representatives own one-third of supervisory boards in many European countries (one-
half in Germany), the equally-weighted supervisory board should be made through reducing seats for 
both existing number of shareholders’ and employees’ representatives or increasing the size of 
supervisory board. 
 
 
Figure 4: Proposed multi-stakeholder board for two-tier board structure 
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The enlarged supervisory board check on the management board, and discuss and approve/reject 
proposal initiated by management board.  Following the current rule of two-tier system, chairman 
of supervisory board has the casting vote to resolve deadlock.  Also, Board committee and ADR 
mechanism mentioned in the previous section are also suggested to establish under this approach. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it is possible to establish multi-stakeholder board under the current corporate 
governance frameworks with minor regulatory adjustment.  However, the difficultly is whether 
shareholders accept to lose their control on board in order to chasing stakeholder democracy (Blount, 
2015).  Moreover, the increasing of outsiders on board brings the issue of confidentiality (i.e. risk 
on information leakage) (Bainbridge, 2008).  These factors make multi-stakeholder governance in 
MNCs a long way to go. 
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